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Abstract. From March 7 to March 12, 2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar
10101 Computational Foundations of Social Choice  was held in Schloss
Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several
participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open
problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the
seminar are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the
seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full
papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms,
Computational Complexity, Multiagent Systems
10101 Executive Summary  Computational Foundations
of Social Choice
This seminar addressed some of the key issues in computational social choice,
a novel interdisciplinary ﬁeld of study at the interface of social choice theory
and computer science. Computational social choice is concerned with the ap-
plication of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms,
such as voting rules and fair division protocols, as well as with the integration
of social choice paradigms into computing. The seminar brought together many
of the most active researchers in the ﬁeld and focussed the research community
currently forming around these important and exciting topics.
Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms, Compu-
tational Complexity, Multiagent Systems
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Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain
Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices
Fuad Aleskerov (Moscow State University, RU)
The problem of manipulation in voting is studied in the case of multi-valued
choice. Well-known and new schemes of preferences extension enabling one to
compare all possible social choices under an arbitrary number of alternatives
are presented. The known indices of degree and eﬃciency of manipulation are
described, and new indices are introduced. These preference extension schemes
and indices are used for computer-aided evaluation of the degree and eﬃciency
of manipulation of the known voting procedures allowing multi-valued choices.
The results obtained are presented for ﬁve voting rules.
Keywords: Manipulation, multiple choice, voting, social choice
Joint work of: Aleskerov, Fuad; Karabekyan, Daniel S.; Sanver, Remzi; Yakuba,
Vyacheslav
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament
Alon Altman (Stanford University, US)
A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tourna-
ments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as
a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that
deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament,
but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that
game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by
selﬁsh agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by
considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is monotonic
if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and pairwise
nonmanipulable if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by
reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combina-
torial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable,
and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.
Keywords: Tournament, manipulation
Joint work of: Altman, Alon; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Tennenholtz, Moshe
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2560
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Data reduction and problem kernels for voting problems
Nadja Betzler (Universität Jena, DE)
Parameterized algorithmics provides the concept of problem kernelization based
on data reduction. We introduce the general idea and give two illustrating exam-
ples of recent work. More precisely, we describe results on problem kernelization
for the Possible Winner problem under k-approval voting and experimental re-
sults based on data reduction for computing Kemeny rankings.
Joint work of: Betzler, Nadja; Bredereck, Robert; Niedermeier, Rolf
Satisfaction Approval Voting
Steven Brams (New York University, US)
We propose a new voting system, satisfaction approval voting (SAV), for multi-
winner elections, in which voters can approve of as many candidates or as many
parties as they like. However, the winners are not those who receive the most
votes, as under approval voting (AV), but those candidates or parties that max-
imize the sum of the satisfaction scores of all voters, where a voter's satisfaction
score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected. If indi-
viduals are the candidates, SAV may give a diﬀerent outcome from AVin fact,
SAV and AV outcomes may be disjointbut SAV generally chooses candidates
representing more diverse interests than does AV (this is demonstrated empiri-
cally in the case of a recent election of the Game Theory Society). On the minus
side, it may encourage more bullet voting than does AV. In party-list systems,
SAV apportions seats to parties according to the Jeﬀerson/d'Hondt method with
a quota constraint, which favors large parties and gives an incentive to smaller
parties to coordinate their policies and forge alliances, even before an election,
that reﬂect their supporters' coalitional preferences.
Keywords: Approval voting, voting systems, representativeness, apportionment,
Game Theory Society
Joint work of: Brams, Steven; Kilgour, Marc
Minimal Retentive Sets in Tournaments
Markus Brill (LMU München, DE)
Many problems in social choice can be addressed using tournament solutions,
i.e., functions that associate with each complete and asymmetric relation on a
set of alternatives a non-empty subset of the alternatives.
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For any given tournament solution S, there is another tournament solution S˚,
which returns the union of all inclusion-minimal sets that satisfy S-retentiveness,
a natural stability criterion with respect to S. Schwartz's tournament equilibrium
set (TEQ) is then deﬁned as TEQ = ˚TEQ . Due to this unwieldy recursive
deﬁnition, preciously little is known about TEQ . Contingent on a well-known
conjecture about TEQ , we show that S˚ inherits a number of important and
desirable properties from S. We thus obtain an inﬁnite hierarchy of attractive
and eﬃciently computable tournament solutions that approximate TEQ , which
itself is intractable. This hierarchy contains well-known tournament solutions
such as the top cycle (TC ) and the minimal covering set (MC ). We further
prove a weaker version of the conjecture mentioned above, which establishes T˚C
as an attractive new tournament solution.
Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Tournament Solutions, Retentiveness, Tour-
nament Equilibrium Set
Joint work of: Brandt, Felix; Brill, Markus; Fischer, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul
Full Paper: http://www2.tcs.iﬁ.lmu.de/∼brandtf/papers/minretentive.pdf
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University, US)
In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based
on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that
agents may behave strategically. An emerging phenomenon is to run such mech-
anisms on a social network; for example, Facebook recently allowed its users to
vote on its future terms of use. One signiﬁcant complication for such mechanisms
is that it may be possible for a user to participate multiple times by creating
multiple identities. Prior work has investigated the design of false-name-proof
mechanisms, which guarantee that there is no incentive to use additional iden-
tiﬁers. Arguably, this work has produced mostly negative results. In this paper,
we show that it is in fact possible to create good mechanisms that are robust to
false-name-manipulation, by taking the social network structure into account.
The basic idea is to exclude agents that are separated from trusted nodes by
small vertex cuts. We provide key results on the correctness, optimality, and
computational tractability of this approach.
Keywords: Mechanism design, false-name-proofness, social networks, voting
Joint work of: Conitzer, Vincent; Immorlica, Nicole; Letchford, Joshua; Mu-
nagala, Kamesh; Wagman, Liad
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Impossibility results for inﬁnite-electorate abstract
aggregation rules
Daniel Eckert (Universität Graz, AT)
It is well known that the literature on judgment aggregation inherits the impos-
sibility results from the aggregation of preferences that it generalises. This is due
to the fact that the typical judgment aggregation problem induces an ultraﬁlter
on the the set of individuals, as was shown in a model theoretic framework by
Herzberg and Eckert (2009), generalising the Kirman-Sondermann correspon-
dence and extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995).
In the ﬁnite case, dictatorship then immediately follows from the principality of
an ultraﬁlter on a ﬁnite set. This is not the case for an inﬁnite set of individuals,
where there exist free ultraﬁters, as Fishburn already stressed in 1970. The main
problem associated with free ultraﬁlters in the literature on aggregation prob-
lems is however, the arbitrariness of their selection combined with the limited
anonymity they guarantee (which already led Kirman and Sondermann (1972)
to speak about invisible dictators). Following another line of Lauwers and Van
Liedekerke's (1995) seminal paper, this note explores another source of impos-
sibility results for free ultraﬁlters: The domain of an ultraproduct over a free
ultraﬁlter extends the individual factor domains, such that the preservation of
the truth value of some sentences by the aggregate model - if this is as usual
to be restricted to the original domain - may again require the exclusion of free
ultraﬁlters, leading to dictatorship once again.
Keywords: Arrow-type preference aggregation, judgment aggregation, model
theory, ﬁrst-order predicate logic, ﬁlter, ultraﬁlter, reduced product, ultraprod-
uct, existential quantiﬁer
Joint work of: Herzberg, Frederik; Eckert, Daniel
Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstentions
Edith Elkind (Nanyang TU - Singapore, SG)
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of
manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate
elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from
this assumption, and consider the setting where all voters are strategic. In this
case, the election can be viewed as a game, and the election outcomes correspond
to Nash equilibria of this game. We use this framework to analyze two variants
of Plurality voting, namely, simultaneous voting, where all voters submit their
ballots at the same time, and sequential voting, where the voters express their
preferences one by one. For simultaneous voting, we characterize the preference
proﬁles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium, but show that it is computation-
ally hard to check if a given proﬁle ﬁts our criterion. For sequential voting, we
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provide a complete analysis of the setting with two candidates, and show that
for three or more candidates the equilibria of sequential voting may behave in a
counterintuitive manner.
Joint work of: Desmedt, Yvo; Elkind, Edith
Voting with Restricted Ballot Languages
Ulle Endriss (University of Amsterdam, NL)
The standard model of voting theory assumes voters with preferences that are
total orders, as well as a ballot language that coincides with the preference
language. In typical AI scenarios, these assumptions do not hold: certain al-
ternatives may be incomparable for some agents, and others may have their
preferences encoded in a format that is diﬀerent from how the preference ag-
gregation mechanism wants them. I shall discuss the consequences of dropping
these assumptions, in particular in view of strategy-proofness.
Joint work of: Pini, Maria Silvia; Rossi, Francesca; Venable, Brent
Full Paper: http://www.illc.uva.nl/∼ulle/pubs/ﬁles/EndrissEtAlIJCAI2009.pdf
Campaign Management via Bribery
Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science & Technology - Krakow, PL)
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external
actor (the briber) oﬀers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her
preferred candidate elected. While bribery is typically associated with cheating in
elections, its mathematical model can also be interpreted in terms of campaign
management. In this work we study a model of bribery which is particularly
well-suited for this campaign-management interpretation. Namely, we consider
a model where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the
voter is asked to implement and we focus on situations where the only allowed
action is to shift the briber's (campaign manager's) preferred candidate forward
on voters' preference lists. We provide hardness results and polynomial time
(approximate) algorithms for this type of bribery in many prominent voting
rules.
Joint work of: Faliszewski, Piotr; Elkind, Edith
Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors
Felix A. Fischer (Harvard University, US)
We consider a setting where each member of a set of n agents approves or
disapproves of any other member of the set.
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Our goal is to design strategyproof and approximately eﬃcient mechanisms
(without payments) for selecting a subset of k agents, for a given value of k. Here,
strategyproofness means that no agent can improve its own chances of being
selected by changing the set of other agents it approves of. A mechanism is called
α-eﬃcient for some α ≥ 1 if the ratio between the sum of approval scores of any
set of size k and that of the set selected by the mechanism is always at most α. We
show that for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n−1}, no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can
provide a ﬁnite approximation ratio. We then present a randomized strategyproof
mechanism that provides an approximation ratio that is bounded from above by
four for any value of k, and approaches one as k grows.
Joint work of: Alon, Noga; Fischer, Felix; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Tennenholtz,
Moshe
Probabilistic power indices for games with abstention
Josep Freixas Bosch (UPC - Barcelona Tech, ES)
In this paper we introduce several power indices for games with abstention or
with three levels of approval that admit a probabilistic interpretation. We analyze
the analogies and discrepancies between standard known indices for simple games
and their extensions for this more general setting. We conclude by proposing
procedures to compute them.
Keywords: Voting, abstention, power indices, probabilistic interpretations
The Complexity of Manipulating Probabilistic
Tournaments
Judy Goldsmith (University of Kentucky, US)
We investigate the complexity of ﬁnding satisﬁcing bribes for three voting paradigms
that correspond to sports tournaments: cup or elimination, challenge, and round-
robin. We assume that, for every pair of candidates i and j, the probability that
i beats j is known, and further, the costs of lowering each such probability by
ﬁxed increments is known. We provide complexity analyses for ﬁve manipula-
tion problems for cup, challenge, and round-robin competitions. These problems
range from polynomial time to NP]P. This shows that the introduction of un-
certainty into the reasoning process can drastically increase the complexity of
manipulation problems, but in some cases, it does not.
Keywords: Social choice, uncertainty, manipulation
Joint work of: Mattei, Nicholas; Goldsmith, Judy; Klapper, Andrew
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The Shield that Never Was: Societies with Single-Peaked
Preferences are More Open to Manipulation and Control
Edith Hemaspaandra (Rochester Institute of Technology, US)
Much work has been devoted, during the past twenty years, to using complexity
to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many results have been ob-
tained showing NP-hardness shields, and recently there has been much focus on
whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by frequently cor-
rect heuristics or by approximations. Our work takes a very diﬀerent approach:
We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political science model of
societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the ﬁrst place. In
particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked preferences, many
existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control evaporate.
Joint work of: Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane
A.; Rothe, Joerg
Complexity of the aggregation of orders into median
orders
Olivier Hudry (ENST - Paris, FR)
Given a collection Π of m individual preferences deﬁned on a same ﬁnite set of
candidates, we consider the problem of aggregating them into a collective pref-
erence minimizing the number of disagreements with respect to Π and verifying
some structural properties. We study the complexity of this problem when the
individual preferences belong to any set containing linear orders and when the
collective preference must verify diﬀerent properties, for instance transitivity. We
show that the considered aggregation problems are NP-hard for diﬀerent types
of collective preferences (including linear orders, acyclic relations, complete pre-
orders, interval orders, semiorders, quasi-orders or weak orders), if the number
m of individual preferences is suﬃciently large.
Keywords: Complexity, median relations, linear orders, acyclic relations, com-
plete preorders, interval orders, semiorders, quasi-orders, weak orders
See also: Hudry, O.: NP-hardness results on the aggregation of linear orders
into median orders, Annals of Operations Research 163 (1), 6388, 2008.
Approval Balloting for Multi-Winner Elections
Marc Kilgour (Wilfrid Laurier University, CA)
Approval balloting seems a natural approach to multi-winner elections because
the objective of the election is to select a subset of the candidates, which is
precisely what each ballot speciﬁes.
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In this survey of procedures for using a set of approval ballots to deter-
mine a winning subset, the class of admissible, or potentially winning, subsets
is treated as a parameter of the election. Most systems are scoring procedures,
in which an admissible subset with the highest score wins, but some are bet-
ter understood as threshold procedures, which select an admissible subset that
meets some standard of representativeness as often as possible, or centralization
procedures, which identify an admissible subset that is most central in the
distribution of ballots. The main purpose of this paper is to collect and classify
the procedures, but some comparative properties are mentioned, including some
bearing on the implications of common forms of admissibility for computational
eﬀort.
Keywords: Approval balloting, multi-winner election, committee election, ap-
proval voting
Divide-and-conquer: a proportional, minimal-envy
cake-cutting algorithm
Christian Klamler (Universität Graz, AT)
We analyze discrete, proportional cake-cutting algorithms that use a minimal
number of cuts (n − 1 if there are n players) to divide a cake that the players
value along one dimension. While these algorithms may not produce an envy-
free or eﬃcient allocation - as these terms are used in the fair-division literature
- one, divide-and-conquer (D&C), minimizes the maximum number of players
that any single player can envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively
to place marks on a cake - valued along a line - that divide it into equal halves
(when n is even) or nearly equal halves (when n is odd), then halves of these
halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C ensures players of at least 1/n
shares, as they each value the cake, if and only if they are truthful. However,
D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have
unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are brieﬂy
discussed.
Joint work of: Brams, Steven; Jones, Michael; Klamler, Christian
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive
Priorities
Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne, CH)
In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student place-
ments at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects
with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent re-
ceives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these
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important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with
responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists
have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof.
First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-
rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type in-
variance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity,
truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization
to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing
resource-monotonicity with two-agent consistent conﬂict resolution. An alterna-
tive characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects
invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and
strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of acyclic respon-
sive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties eﬃciency, group strategy-
proofness, and consistency.
Keywords: Consistency, deferred-acceptance algorithm, indivisible objects al-
location, resource-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, weak non-wastefulness.
Joint work of: Klaus, Bettina; Ehlers, Lars
Full Paper: http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/publications/17-2009-cah.pdf
See also: Ehlers, L., Klaus, B.: Allocation via Deferred Acceptance, CIREC
Cahier 17-2009, 2009.
The men who were not even there: Legislative voting with
absentees
Laszló Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University, HU)
Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing
decisions by altering the cast `yes' or `no' votes. Recently this analysis has been
extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as yes or no votes can change
decisions. This theory is often applied to weighted voting situations, where voters
can cast multiple votes. Measuring the power of a party in a national assembly
seems to ﬁt this model, but in fact its power comprises of votes of individual
representatives each having a single vote. These representatives may vote yes
or no, or may abstain, but in some cases they are not even there to vote. We
look at absentees not due to a conscious decision, but due to illness, for instance.
Formally voters will be absent, say, ill, with a certain probability and only present
otherwise. As in general not all voters will be present, a thin majority may quickly
melt away making a coalition that is winning in theory a losing one in practice. A
simple combinatorial model allows us to diﬀerentiate between winning and more
winning and losing and less losing coalitions reﬂected by a voting game that is
not any more simple. Among other properties this model enables us to verify
the intuitively appealing notion that a larger parliament is less democratic using
the language of power indices. We use data for selected years in the Hungarian
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National Assembly both to illustrate the relation of theoretical and eﬀective
power and show our results working in the practice.
Keywords: A priori voting power, power index, being absent from voting,
minority, Shapley-Shubik index, Shapley value
How hard is it to control sequential elections via the
agenda?
Jérôme Lang (Université Paris-Dauphine, FR)
Voting on multiple related issues is an important and diﬃcult problem. The
key diﬃculty is that the number of alternatives is exponential in the number of
issues, and hence it is infeasible for the agents to rank all the alternatives. A
simple approach is to vote on the issues one at a time, in sequence; however,
a drawback is that the outcome may depend on the order in which the issues
are voted upon and decided, which gives the chairperson some control over the
outcome of the election because she can strategically determine the order. While
this is undeniably a negative feature of sequential voting, in this paper we temper
this judgment by showing that the chairperson's control problem is, in most
cases, computationally hard.
Keywords: Voting, multiple elections, control, computational complexity
Joint work of: Conitzer, Vincent; Lang, Jérôme; Xia, Lirong
Full Paper: http://ijcai.org/papers09/Papers/IJCAI09-028.pdf
See also: Proceedings of IJCAI-09, 103108, 2009.
Approval Voting, Theory and Experiments
Jean-Francois Laslier (Ecole Polytechnique - Palaiseau, FR)
This is a survey of recent research on approval voting in experimental economics
and social choice. Experimental economics showed that voters behave strategi-
cally. This behavior is well captured by game-theoretical models, at the individ-
ual level. At the aggregate level, the theory correctly predicts the observation
that Approval Voting tends to favor middle-of-road candidates and elect Con-
dorcet winners.
On Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
Vangelis Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business, GR)
We are interested in identifying mechanisms that maximize the ﬁnal social wel-
fare generated.
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To be able to compare mechanisms with regard to their welfare, we introduce
the concept of welfare undominated mechanisms. This concept induces a partial
order on mechanisms and we study the question of ﬁnding minimal elements
with respect to this partial order. We focus on two domains, namely, public
project problems and multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders. We show
that in the ﬁrst case the VCG mechanism is welfare undominated. In the second
domain we exhibit a family of mechanisms that are welfare undominated and
include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism. In fact we show that among anonymous
and linear mechanisms, this family coincides with the set of welfare undominated
mechanisms. If time permits, we will also present results on sequential aspects
of these mechanisms, where bidders announce their bid sequentially according
to some ﬁxed order.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Social Welfare
Joint work of: Apt, Krzysztof; Conitzer, Vincent; Guo, Mingyu; Markakis,
Vangelis
The possible winner problem with a growing set of
candidates
Nicolas Maudet (Université Paris-Dauphine, FR)
In some voting situations, some new candidates may show up in the course of the
process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates
are possible winners, given that either a ﬁxed number k or an unbounded number
of new candidates will be added.
Joint work of: Chevaleyre, Yann; Lang, Jérôme; Maudet, Nicolas; Monnot,
Jérôme
How hard is Kemeny aggregation? and other (Bayesian)
statistics with rankings
Marina Meila (University of Washington, US)
People often express their preferences for web pages, products, candidates in an
election as a ranked list. Ranked lists are also the standard output of search
engines like Google or Sequest. The interest of this talk is to show how one can
do statistics as usual with this kind of discrete, structured, high-dimensional
data. I will deﬁne statistical models over spaces of permutations and partial
orderings, and present methods for estimating these models from data. I will
brieﬂy describe the Maximum Likelihood problem and an algorithm for solving
it. Then I will focus on recent work in Bayesian estimation for a class of widely
used models called Mallows models. These models have continuous parameters
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representing the spread of the distribution and discrete parameters representing
a central permutation. Therefore they raise extremely interesting statistical and
computational challenges. I will describe the conjugate prior for this model class,
and Monte Carlo algorithms for eﬀectively sampling from the posterior, with
application to preference data.
Keywords: Preferences, ranked data, exponential models, Maximum Likelihood,
Bayesian estimation
Joint work of: Chen, Harr; Ali, Alnur; Mandhani, Bhushan; Bao, Le; Phadnis,
Kapil; Patterson, Arthur; Bilmes, Jeﬀ
On the stability of a scoring rules set under the IAC
Vincent Merlin (Caen University, FR)
A society facing a choice problem has also to choose the voting rule itself from
a set of diﬀerent possible voting rules. In such situations, the consequentialism
property allows us to induce voters' preferences on voting rules from prefer-
ences over alternatives. A voting rule employed to resolve the society's choice
problem is self-selective if it chooses itself when it is also used in choosing the
voting rule. A voting rules set is said to be stable if it contains at least one
self-selective voting rule at each proﬁle of preferences on voting rules. We con-
sider in this paper a society which will make a choice from a set constituted
by three alternatives {a, b, c} and a set of the three well-known scoring voting
rules {Borda,Plurality,Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Anonymous Culture
assumption (IAC), we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of
voting rules. We use Ehrhart polynomials in order to solve our problems. This
method counts the number of lattice points inside a convex bounded polyhedron
(polytope). We discuss brieﬂy recent algorithmic solutions to this method and use
it to determine the probability of stabillity of {Borda,Plurality,Antiplurality}
set.
Keywords: Self-selectivity, Stability, Consequentialism, Ehrhart polynomials
Joint work of: Merlin, Vincent; Diss, Mostapha; Louichi, Ahmed; Smaoui,
Hatem
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2561
Non-cooperative approaches to claims or bankruptcy
problems
Hans Peters (Maastricht University, NL)
In a claims or bankruptcy problem an estate has to be divided among several
claimants whose total claim exceeds the size of the estate.
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This paper extends the non-cooperative approach to this problem, as initiated
by O'Neill (1982), who also initiated the cooperative, axiomatic approach. In
the non-cooperative approach, players put claims on parts of the estate, and
these parts are then distributed proportionally with respect to the number of
claims. In the model where players have homogenous preferences on the estate,
we extend the approach of O'Neill by allowing players to put multiple claims on
the same part of the estate, and by considering the case where individual claims
may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is
obtained both for restricted claims problems, where individual claims do not
exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are
considered, which result in proportional division in equilibrium. This part of
the presentation is based on Atlamaz, Berden, Peters, and Vermeulen (revised
version, January 2010). In a second part of the presentation the assumption of
homogeneity of the preferences is dropped and, instead, we consider much more
general preferences. This situation is more diﬃcult to handle and the focus will be
on existence of Nash equilibrium. This part of the presentation will be based on
forthcoming work of Palvölgyi, Peters, and Vermeulen. The applications extend
to more general situations, e.g., multi-item auctions.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, claims problems, non-cooperative games.
Joint work of: Atlamaz, Murat; Berden, Caroline; Palvolgyi, Denes; Peters,
Hans; Vermeulen, Dries
See also: Atlamaz, M., Berden, C., Peters, H., Vermeulen, D.: Non-cooperative
solutions for claims problems, Maastricht University (revised version, 2010).
Palvölgyi, D., Peters, H., Vermeulen, D.: Non-cooperative solutions for claims
problems with inhomogenous preferences, Maastricht University (forthcoming,
2010).
Axiomatic Districting
Clemens Puppe (KIT - Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, DE)
In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of
geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they
jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts
one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the optimal ger-
rymandering rule). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy
our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.
Keywords: Districting, gerrymandering
Joint work of: Puppe, Clemens; Tasnádi, Attila
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Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded
Cake-Cutting Protocols
Joerg Rothe (Universität Düsseldorf, DE)
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a cake (i.e., a divisible resource) and
assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players
feels to have received a fair amount of the cake. An important notion of fairness
is envy-freeness: No player wishes to switch the portion of the cake received with
another player's portion. Despite intense eﬀorts in the past, it is still an open
question whether there is a ﬁnite bounded envy-free cake-cutting protocol for an
arbitrary number of players, and even for four players. We introduce the notion
of degree of guaranteed envy-freeness (DGEF) as a measure of how good a cake-
cutting protocol can approximate the ideal of envy-freeness while keeping the
protocol ﬁnite bounded (trading being disregarded). We propose a new ﬁnite
bounded proportional protocol for any number n ≥ 3 of players, and show that
this protocol has a DGEF of 1 + d(n2)/2e. Among known ﬁnite bounded cake-
cutting protocols for an arbitrary number of players, this is the best DGEF
currently known to hold. We will make the case that improving the DGEF
even further is a tough challenge, and determine, for comparison, the DGEF of
selected known ﬁnite bounded cake-cutting protocols.
Keywords: Cake-cutting, fair division
Joint work of: Lindner, Claudia; Rothe, Joerg
See also: Lindner, C., Rothe, J.: Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite
Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols. Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Internet
& Network Economics (WINE 2009), Rome, Italy. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes
in Computer Science 5929, pp. 149159, 2009.
Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
Remzi Sanver (Istanbul Bilgi University, TR)
Approval Voting calls for an extension of the Arrovian preference aggregation
model, by incorporating elements of cardinality and inter- personal comparability
into individual preferences through assuming the existence of a common zero.
We revisit Approval Voting as well as other concepts of Social Choice Theory
within this extended model.
Keywords: Approval voting
See also: Forthcoming in Handbook of Approval Voting (eds. Laslier, Jean-
Francois and Sanver, Remzi), Springer.
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Weighted and Roughly Weighted Simple Games
Arkadii Slinko (University of Auckland, NZ)
This paper contributes to the program of numerical characterisation and clas-
siﬁcation of simple games outlined in the classical monograph of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). One of the most fundamental questions of this pro-
gram is what makes a simple game a weighted majority game. The necessary
and suﬃcient conditions that guarantee weightedness were obtained by Elgot
(1961) and reﬁned by Taylor and Zwicker (1992). If a simple game does not have
weights, then rough weights may serve as a reasonable substitute (see their use
in Taylor and Zwicker (1999). A simple game is roughly weighted if there exists
a system of weights and a threshold such that all coalitions whose combined
weight is above the threshold are winning and all coalitions whose combined
weight is below the threshold are losing and a tie-breaking is needed to classify
the coalitions whose combined weight is exactly the threshold. Not all simple
games are roughly weighted, and the class of projective games is a prime exam-
ple. In this paper we give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a simple game
to have rough weights. We deﬁne two functions f(n) and g(n) that measure the
deviation of a simple game from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted
majority game, respectively. We formulate known results in terms of lower and
upper bounds for these functions and improve those bounds. We also investigate
rough weightedness of simle games with a small number of players.
Keywords: Simple game, weighted majority game, trading transform, trade
robustness, rough weights, projective games, Hadamard games
Joint work of: Slinko, Arkadii; Gvozdeva, Tatiana
Where are the hard manipulation problems for STV
elections?
Toby Walsh (University of New South Wales, AU)
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that, under some simple assump-
tions, any voting rule is manipulable. That is, it may pay agents not to re-
port their preferences truthfully. One possible escape route, ﬁrst proposed by
Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick is computational complexity. Perhaps it is computa-
tionally too diﬃcult to ﬁnd a manipulation? One of the ﬁrst voting rules shown
to be diﬃcult to manipulate is single transferable vote (STV). It remains today
as one of the few voting rules which it is NP-hard to manipulate with unweighted
votes. However, there is increasing concern that worst-case NP-hardness results
may not reﬂect the diﬃculty of manipulation in practice. In this talk, using
the phase transition tools described in a recent IJCAI-09 paper, I discuss some
recent empirical results in computing manipulations of STV elections.
Computational Foundations of Social Choice 17
Keywords: Computational social choice, manipulability, STV voting, NP-
hardness
Full Paper: http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/∼tw/conferences.html
Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote
Toby Walsh (University of New South Wales, AU)
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation.
However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoret-
ical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study
empirically the cost of manipulating the single transferable vote (STV) rule. This
was one of the ﬁrst rules shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. It also appears
to be one of the harder rules to manipulate since it involves multiple rounds
and since, unlike many other rules, it is NP-hard for a single agent to manip-
ulate without weights on the votes or uncertainty about how the other agents
have voted. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute
how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipula-
tion by a single agent was impossible. It remains an interesting open question if
manipulation by a coalition of agents is hard to compute in practice.
Keywords: Computational social choice, manipulability, STV voting, NP-
hardness
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2558
Computing and evaluating the unique outcomes of
strategic sequential voting games
Lirong Xia (Duke University, US)
Game-theoretic analyses of strategic voting are generally troubled by equilib-
rium selection problems. In this talk, I will discuss our work on two complete-
information models (where the preferences are common knowledge among the
voters) that lead to a unique outcome. In one, the voters vote in sequence; in
the other, there are multiple binary issues that are sequentially voted on by
the voters. We consider a number of related questions, including how to com-
pute the solution (involving a relation to compilation complexity), paradoxes,
comparisons to truthful voting, and communication complexity.
Joint work of: Xia, Lirong; Conitzer, Vincent; Lang, Jérôme
False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms
Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University, JP)
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple
identiﬁers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses).
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Laslier and William S. Zwicker
If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional proﬁt by us-
ing multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are
sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under ﬁctitious names can be prof-
itable. A bid made under a ﬁctitious name is called a false-name bid. In this talk,
I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids.
Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, mechanism design, false-name bids
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2562
Voting Machines
William S. Zwicker (Union College - Schenectady, US)
We begin by demonstrating some interactive software written by Davide Cer-
vone. It simulates rubber bands, or strings with weights and pulleys, to illustrate
the diﬀerent eﬀect of voting with the mean, or with the mediancentre - a spa-
tial version of the median. When each preference ranking is associated with an
appropriate vertex of the m-permutahedron, the rubber-band machine imple-
ments the Borda count for m alternatives. The strings-and-weights machines
implements the Mediancentre Borda, or MCBorda voting rule. MCBorda has
unusual properties, and these raise some fundamental questions. When we com-
pare diﬀerent voting rules to decide which is better, what are the relationships
among decisiveness, resistance to manipulability, and positive responsiveness? Is
there actually a diﬀerence between a manipulation and a positive response, or
are these two sides of the same coin? This last question led, in work with Remzi
Sanver, to proposing the One-way Monotonicity property (we'll deﬁne it in the
talk), a new member of a family that includes:  (Classical) Monotonicity - rais-
ing a candidate a in a voter's ranking (without changing the relative preference
ranking among the other alternatives) cannot damage a's prospects  Partici-
pation - the addition of one more ballot cannot yield an outcome worse, in the
eyes of the participating voter, than she would have obtained by abstaining 
Half-way Monotonicity (also new) - No voter can gain by completely reversing
his ballot. Notice that a failure of half-way monotonicity represents a most ex-
treme form of manipulation, in which a voter gains by totally misrepresenting
his true preferences. Via an extension of an argument due to Hervé Moulin, we
have shown that every Condorcet extension for four or more alternatives can be
manipulated in this way.
Keywords: Median voting rule, Mean voting rule, decisiveness, responsiveness,
manipulability, one-way monotonicity
Joint work of: Zwicker, William S.; Cervone, Davide; Dai, Ronghua; Gnoutch-
eﬀ, Daniel; Lanterman, Grant; Mackenzie, Andrew; Morse, Ari; Sanver, Remzi;
Srivastava, Nikhil
